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Abstract 
 
Do domestic institutions filter the effects of international openness on levels of 
government corruption?  The analyses in this study demonstrate a more nuanced 
understanding of a previously understood phenomenon — that while openness has a 
negative relationship with corruption, sometimes this relationship is substantially 
influenced by the domestic context, a relationship that has been underdeveloped by 
previous empirical studies.   However, as opposed to mainly economic factors of 
openness such as levels of trade or capital freedom, I highlight another salient type of 
globalization — social and political integration.  Focusing exclusively on a sample of 
over 90 developing countries, I find that on the effect of openness on corruption is 
conditioned by domestic institutions.  Namely, I examine the level of press freedoms 
in a country as an intervening variable.  The empirical evidence suggests that while 
freedom of the press is less important for political openness to have a significant 
impact in combating corruption, a free press is essential for social openness to effect 
negatively government corruption. 
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Introduction 
“My message is: it is through openness and good governance at all levels of society, 
right down to the grass roots, that people will be empowered; change takes root and 
development sustained.”-Gordon Brown, 2006  
   “A popular government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is 
but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both” 
James Madison, 1832 
  
 
 
          In recent years, numerous academic empirical studies have been devoted to 
understanding the determinants of corruption.  On the policy side, international 
organisations (IO’s) such as the World Bank, WTO and the IMF have made significant 
strides in attempting to curb world-wide corruption, particularly in developing countries1.  
A consensus is emerging in the academic and policy worlds on improving our 
understanding of corruption by using cross-national variations.  While institutional and 
cultural factors have received a considerable amount of attention as key explanatory 
variables, a subset in the corruption literature has focused on the effects of international 
openness on government corruption (Krueger 1974; Ades and Di Tella 1997 and 1999; 
Wei 1999; Wei and Sheifler 2000; Bonaglia et al. 2001; Lambsdorff, 2004; Gatti 2004; 
Torrez 2002; Sandholtz and Gray 2000 and 2003).  Among the analyses in the openness-
corruption nexus, the empirical findings have mainly been supportive of the positive 
relationship between openness and good governance.  Thus among many economists and 
political scientists there is a general agreement in the empirical literature, in economic 
and political science, that openness has a negative relationship with corruption. 
         However, as some scholars aptly point out, beginning with the work of Rose-
Ackerman (1978) and subsequently Sanholtz and Gray (2003), the effect of “openness” 
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on corruption can also come from normative effects.  It is argued that growing 
interdependence among states politically, through international organisations (IGO’s, 
NGO’s, etc.) and socially, through the diffusion of technology, media and migration, may 
have a significant impact on spreading anti-corruption norms.  Along with a substantial 
increase in economic interdependence over the past few decades, states have experienced 
a substantial rise in political and social interdependence as well.  However, the impact of 
the socio-political side of openness on corruption remains largely unexplored empirically.   
While this analysis also takes into account variations in economic openness, I contribute 
to the openness-corruption nexus by mainly focusing upon the effect of openness by non-
economic factors. Such factors include membership, cross-boarder communications and 
UN mission participation.   
        A second important contribution that this study adds to the literature is the attention 
on the interplay between openness, an international variable, and domestic institutions of 
transparency.  Specifically, I seek to understand how the level of press freedom in a 
country might inhibit or encourage the spread of anti-corruption norms as social and 
political interactions increase.  Often, previous empirical studies on openness have 
ignored or divided the potentially significant effects into domestic institutions.  Thus, this 
study seeks to provide information about the following empirical question: does the 
impact of international openness in influencing levels of corruption depend on the level 
of the press freedom present in that country?  Further, does social and political openness 
have different effects depending on the domestic context of the press in developing 
countries?   
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        Finally, this study contributes to the literature by focusing exclusively on developing 
states.  I test these questions empirically on over 90 developing countries using two 
widely used measures of corruption.  I estimate the results with both cross-sectional and 
panel time series regressions to assure a level of robustness in the results.  The evidence I 
report corroborates previous empirical studies in that there is a significant and negative 
relationship between openness and corruption.  However, this relationship is nuanced.  
While social factors have a strong, negative impact on corruption scores in the sample of 
developing states, such factors have either no significant effect, or are found to 
exacerbate corruption when press freedoms are low.  Conversely, political openness is a 
negligible determinant in the full sample, yet its impact is strongest in fighting corruption 
in the countries that maintain the most restrictive with domestic press freedoms.     
       This analysis is developed as follows.  First, I review the empirical literature which 
has focused on the determinants of corruption, focusing primarily on the relationship 
between openness and corruption and elucidate my testable hypotheses.  Second, I 
discuss and display recent trends in both socio-political openness and press freedoms 
over the past 10 to 15 years.  Third, I discuss data and specifications of the models.  
Fourth, I present the empirical findings.  I end this study with some concluding remarks 
and interpretations of the results.  
 
Determinants of corruption  
       Whether focusing on domestic political institutions (Meyerson 1993; La Porta et al 
1998; Persson et al 1997 and 2004; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Treisman 2000; Dreyer 
2004; Andrews and Montinola 2004; Norris 2004; Charron 2007), press freedoms 
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(Brunetti and Weder 2003; Lindstedt and Naurin 2005) or factors of international 
openness (Kreuger 1974, Di Tella 1997 and 1999, Leamer 1988, Torrez 2002, Treisman 
2000, Wei 1999; Sanholtz and Koetzle 2000, Gatti 2004, Sandholtz and Gray 2003) there 
is a strong and consistent empirical consensus that expanding powers away from the 
executive, and increased accountability and openness have a negative relationship with 
corruption.  Scholars have generally found that countries with strong executive branches, 
limited opposition parties, low degrees of democratic accountability, low economic 
development and are relatively closed to international competition and ideas are more 
corrupt, ceteris paribus.   
         Specifically regarding openness, though different measures of corruption indicators 
are often employed in various empirical studies, the statistical relationship appears 
generalizable – countries that are more ‘open’ often exhibit less corruption.  A common 
argument asserts that in closed states, political elites can more easily manipulate 
information and deal in bribes and patron-client-type exchanges that are less visible 
relative to more open societies.  In explaining this trend in the data, scholars have mainly 
posited two somewhat compatible hypotheses.  First of which are rationalist, economic 
reasons as to why openness reduces corruption.  Bonaglia et al. (2001) argue economic 
openness reduces corruption through three distinct mechanisms: first, when trade 
restrictions become less restrictive (Krueger, 1974 and Gatti, 1999).  Second, openness 
increases the level of foreign competition (Ades and Di Tella, 1999); and third, this in 
turn draws in more international investors (Wei, 2000; Wei and Sheifler 2000).  Ades and 
Di Tella argue that “competition from foreign firms reduces the rents enjoyed by 
domestic firms, and this reduces the reward of corruption”.  They posit that as foreign 
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competition increases in a country, demands for more efficient business practices 
increase, which in turn compels corruption to decrease.  Rent-seeking and kickbacks, 
which can lead to sub-optimal economic outcomes, are discouraged due to transparency, 
in what Gatti (2004) labels the ‘foreign competition effect’2.   
            The socio-political (‘anticorruption norm’) hypothesis focuses mainly on non-
economic factors such the spread of anti-corruption norms and rule-following behaviors, 
for example through increased international interactions and membership in IO’s and 
NGO’s (Rose-Ackerman 1978; Abbot and Snidal 2001; Bukovansky 1999; Sanholtz and 
Gray 2003).  However, this side of the coin is much less empirically developed than that 
of the trade openness- corruption nexus.  Largely based on developments from the 
constructivist perspective in international politics, transnational actors project new norms 
and behaviour into the system and as states become more open to international 
influences, they become more open to adopting such behaviour.  According to this 
ideational-type hypothesis, it is through the norms proliferated by the entrepreneurs in 
IO’s (Finnemore 1993; Finnemore and Sikkitk 1998; Sanholtz and Gray 2003), or other 
forms of information proliferation (i.e., contact with foreign governments, U.N. 
participation, increase in Internet and foreign communication sources, etc.) that pressure 
will be placed upon governments to reduce corruption due to the diffusion of 
condemnation against corruptive practices.  Whether from international sources (I.O.’s, 
etc.) or from citizens (spread of technological media sources) the number of international 
interactions increase, which serve as mechanisms of change in the communication of 
practices and values in politics and business transactions.  Though it argues through the 
lens of cultural and normative reasoning rather than focusing primarily on economic 
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incentives, the ‘anticorruption norm’ hypothesis is certainly compatible and possibly 
serves as a compliment rather than a rival to the rationalist hypothesis of openness and 
corruption.   
        Previous research has demonstrated that the diffusion of norms in the international 
system has an effect on states regarding a number of issues, such as women and minority 
rights, land mines, weapon proliferation and decolonization (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998; Dubois 1994, Price 1998).  Pertinent to this analysis, such scholars also speak to 
how domestic institutions and politics, mainly democratic, ‘filter’ the effect of such 
international norms in such ways.  Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) write, “International 
norms must always work their influence through the filter of domestic structures and 
domestic norms, which can produce important variations in compliance and interpretation 
of these norms” and that “there is a two-level norm game occurring in which the 
domestic and the international norm tables are increasingly linked” (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998: 893; also see Putnam 1998).  Under this logic it is clear that certain 
domestic structures must be taken into account when assessing the possibility of ‘norm 
acceptance’ of a trend such as anti-corruption.   
      Though both the economic and normative hypotheses are plausible and have received 
some degree of development in the literature, previous analyses are overlooking a salient 
factor that might allow or inhibit such proliferation of anti-corruption behavior – 
domestic institutions of transparency.  I maintain that there is a degree of over simplicity 
in the theoretical design of a number of such analyses that argue international 
transparency (structural, interstate variables) determine change in government behavior 
(agent-centered, domestic variables) without accounting for potentially salient domestic 
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institutions which might possibly assist or inhibit the proliferation of anti-corruption 
norms, irrespective of increases in international openness.  What this analysis argues is 
that without certain domestic conditions of transparency, such as a free press to serve as a 
conduit through which the new norms of anti-corruption are spread, little political 
pressure is applied to domestic leaders to actually reduce corruption.  If the citizens of a 
country where corruption is rampant amongst state leaders are not properly informed of 
the economic and political behaviors of their leaders, or do not know that anti-corruption 
work is a priority in many countries, then leaders can continue to mask corruptive actions 
from their citizens.  They thus have little incentive to alter economic and political 
behaviors for which they have benefited over time.     
        The norm hypothesis postulated by Sandholz and Gray (2003) asserts that countries 
with higher levels of transnational interactions, such as participation in international 
organizations, are expected to be on average less corrupt.  This hypothesis obviously 
implies that international factors have a significant influence on a domestic dependent 
variable.  Yet this type of openness is not directly related to economic market forces and 
is socio-political in nature, thus its impact will be through the spread of information.   It 
is therefore the purpose of this analysis to test the impact of international social openness 
on levels of domestic corruption, taking into account the level of a state’s press freedom.  
This study therefore argues that while the normative hypothesis of anti-corruption norm 
proliferation is entirely plausible, there are certain domestic variables such as a free press 
that need to be present in order for the structural variables to have a significant influence 
in altering the behavior of domestic leaders.  Without the proper channels in place to 
allow for the spread of such information, elites have no pressure on them to decrease 
 7
corruption.  Consequently, this analysis argues that there are mitigating domestic forces 
which may or may not allow for the proliferation of such norms within countries.  
Specifically, without unbiased domestic institutions that can help foster the spread of 
such international norms as anti-corruption, the effect of openness is expected to be 
negligible.  Such unbiased institutions of information are found in a free press, without 
which, openness plays a small role, if any, in reducing corruption.  
       I thus test the following hypotheses empirically on a number of developing states: 
 
H1: As social openness increases, the level of corruption in a country is expected to 
decrease, given that press freedoms are present, ceteris paribus. 
 
H1a: Given that press freedoms are absent in a country, social openness is not expected 
to have an effect on the level of a country’s corruption 
 
H2: As political openness increases, the level of corruption in a country is expected to 
decrease, given that press freedoms are present, ceteris paribus. 
 
H2a: Given that press freedoms are absent in a country, political openness is not 
expected to have an effect on the level of a country’s corruption 
 
 
Trends in Openness, Press Freedom and Corruption 
        In the post-war and in particular in the post Cold War era, states have become more 
open by most measures of international openness.  The KOF Index of Globalisation 
(Drehler 2006), which distinguishes among three components of openness — economic, 
social and political — demonstrates that every region in the world has experienced 
increases in their respective aggregate openness scores over the last two decades.  For 
example, between the years of 1984 and 2004, the aggregate score of the African social 
openness index rose from 21 to about 36, or a 71.5% increase, and similarly political 
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openness increased by 62.5%, from 32 to 52.  Similar increases can be observed in every 
other developing area for both types of openness, which are shown in aggregate form in 
figure 1.  Though OECD states have mainly recorded relatively high openness scores in 
all areas since the beginning of the OF data, it is developing areas that have seen stark 
transformations in the recent years regarding openness.  According to the openness-
corruption hypothesis, whether economic or normative, this increase should significantly 
reduce corruption in developing areas.  While the rationalist and economic hypothesis 
have been explored by a number of previous studies, the impact of cultural and political 
openness remains largely unexplored, in particular when taking into account certain 
domestic institutions that can either enhance or hinder the proliferation of anti-corruption 
ideas.  Thus, I employ the two measures of openness — social and political — to serve as 
proxies for exposure to international norms and ideas.  The full list of indicators in each 
index, along with respective weights, is located in table 1 in the ensuing section.  The 
aggregate trends in social and political openness from 1990-2004 are displayed in figure 
1 below: 
 
***Figure 1 Here***  
    
        Table 1displays a brief preliminary analysis which is intended to demonstrate the 
trends over the last decade in social and political openness in both sub-sets of developing 
countries concerning press freedoms — free, partially free and not free.  The number of 
observations coded for each of the two groups is listed on the right-hand side of the 
table3.  While countries with more press freedoms recorded significantly higher social 
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openness scores throughout the time period, aggregate scores in both groups experienced 
substantial increases in openness over time.  Concerning political openness, the same can 
be said of the general pattern of increase.  However, there is no statistical difference in 
aggregate political openness scores between states with press freedoms and those that 
lack a free press throughout the sample of developing states.  These figures are simply 
meant to demonstrate that there are no increases in either type of openness that have been 
skewed toward one of the two sub-sets of states — both states with and without press 
freedoms in the aggregate experienced increased exposure to social and political 
internationalisation.  Furthermore, while states with greater press freedoms had higher 
social scores, the difference between the two groups in their I.O. participation, embassy 
count and U.N. Security Mission participation was negligible.  Since differences at levels 
of openness negligible between the two groups, then the press-freedom variable may play 
a significant mitigating role at levels of corruption within developing states according to 
the empirical hypotheses.     
***Table 1 Here*** 
 
       In figures 2 and 3, I separate press freedom and corruption scores into the aggregate 
total by region4.  In figure 2, clearly outside the West (West Europe, North America, 
Australia, New Zealand and Japan) significant variation is observed.  Data in figure 2 for 
press freedoms has been inverted so that higher scores indicate more freedom.  Clearly, 
Latin America (including the Caribbean), the Pacific Islands and post Soviet states and 
Eastern Europe rank among the higher of the developing areas in press freedom 
according to the Freedom House data from 1994-2004.  Conversely, Middle Eastern 
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(includes North Africa), South East Asian and African countries rank among the lowest 
in freedom of the press, all with average aggregate scores below 50.   
 
***Figures 2 and 3 here*** 
        
         Moving to the dependent variable, a regional breakdown of PRS Group corruption 
scores is provided in figure 3.  Again, states from the West display scores significantly 
higher than those from developing regions where variation is again significant among 
such areas.  Corruption scores over the decade between 1994 and 2003 show that 
developing areas range between 0.42 and 0.61 on a scale of ‘0’ to ‘1.'  African states lag 
significantly behind, recording the lowest average of any of the regions.  Post Soviet and 
East European and South Asian states demonstrate the highest averages of all developing 
areas with approximately 0.61.   
 
 
Specification and Methodology 
         The primary focus of this analysis is to test whether social openness and political 
openness have a negative impact on corruption and if there is an intervening effect on this 
relationship depending on the level of a country’s press freedom.  To present a 
parsimonious model while simultaneously reducing the likelihood of potential omitted 
variable bias I include the following indicators in the full regression. 
        Given that data on the dependent variable can be somewhat unreliable, I employ two 
common measures to check for robustness in the results.  The first measure of corruption 
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is taken from the International Country Risk Guide, the PRS Group of financial risk 
indicators. The PRS Group, a think tank specialised in economic and political risk 
assessment internationally, has published monthly data for business and investors on over 
140 countries since 1980.  The PRS measure is primarily concerned with accounting for 
“excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, 
and suspiciously close ties between politics and business.”5 The period ranges from 
1984-2003 and has up to 139 countries.  The data in the analysis has a finite range from 
‘0’ — ‘1’, with higher scores indicating lower levels of perceived corruption. There are 
several advantages to this measure.  One, it is available for 20 years, which allows f
any institutional reform of a country’s vertical or horizontal power sharing structure
structural shifts in the domestic fractionalisation. Second, it includes some wide scope of 
developed and developing countries so that the results of this analysis are highly 
generalizable.  It has been used by other recent empirical studies (Ades and Di Tella 
1999; Gatti 2004; Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2003).   
or 
 or 
        The second measure of corruption is taken from the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 
2006).  The data seeks to capture the perception of a government’s “control of 
corruption”, conventionally described as seeking private gain from public resources.  The 
data range from-2.5 to 2.5, with higher scores indicating lower levels of corruption.  Due 
to incomplete data, I employ an unbalanced, pooled data set, which allows for greater 
observations through more cases and thus increases reliability of the estimates 
(Globerman and Shapiro 2003). 
        The key domestic institution in the study is the level of a country’s press freedom.  
Freedom House International has annually coded the level of press freedom from 1994-
 12
2006 on a scale of 0-100, with lower scores indicating more freedom of the press.  
Freedom House has also trichotomised the data into ‘not free’ (61-100), ‘partially free’ 
(31-60) and ‘free’ (0-30).  The organisation as recorded press freedom scores for more 
than 190 countries.  All three variables were taken from the Quality of Government 
Institute database (Teorell, Holmberg and Rothstein 2007).  A more detailed description 
of the summary statistics is located in the appendix.   
      The primary international variable in the model tries to capture the proliferation of the 
anti corruption norm.  I attempt to proxy this process in two ways.  Using the KOF Index 
of Globalisation Data (Dreher 2006), I use two measures of openness, social and 
political.  First of which, social openness, is an index of three broad measures which 
account for the level of “personal contacts, information flows and cultural proximity (to 
other countries)."  This measure is intended to capture whether the spread of ideas 
through personal and media contacts influence the corruption level of a country.  The 
second is political openness, which tries to capture the diffusion of government policies 
through the amount of interaction each state has with each other and with international 
organisations.  Included in the political openness index are the numbers of international 
organisations to which each country belongs, the number of embassies and high 
commissions in each country and the number of U.N. Peacekeeping missions in which a 
country participates.  A full description of each component of the social and political 
openness indices is shown in the appendix. 
          Regarding the control variables in the model to account for rival hypotheses, 
studies have shown that there is a strong and robust relationship between the strength of 
democratic institutions and levels of corruption (Ades and Tella 1997; Fisman and Gatti 
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2002; Gatti 2004, Sandholz and Gray 2003, La Porta et al 1999).  I therefore include a 
country’s democracy level in the analysis that incorporates two widely used measures of 
democratic strength, Polity and Freedom House (see Teorell, Holmberg and Rothstein 
2007).  Second, I account for the economic development of a country, as measured by the 
log of GDP per capita taken from the United Nations ‘National Accounts’ data set.  Most 
empirical studies demonstrate that higher degrees of wealth are associated with lower 
degrees of corruption, thus I anticipate this relationship to be robust in this analysis as 
well.  Studies have also shown that highly divided states are more prone to corruption 
compared to more homogenous one (Mauro 1995; Alesina et al. 2003; Charron 2007), so 
I include a measure to account for the level of a state’s ethnic fractionalisation, as coded 
by Alesina et al (2003).  I also include a number of dummy control variables in the 
model, the first of which indicates whether a country is involved in a conflict — either 
domestic or external.  I anticipate that if a country is involved in some type of military 
conflict, then corruption is likely to increase.  Some scholars have asserted that internal 
and external conflicts have a positive relationship with human rights violations. As for 
cases of conflicts, corruptive practices and human rights violations might be the only way 
in which a government thinks it can sustain order (see Apodaca 2001; Blanton 1999; Poe 
and Tate 1994).  This factor is thus controlled for.  I also include a number of regional 
dummy controls to account for geopolitical factors.  Certain regions such as Africa, have 
higher aggregate levels of corruption scores than the mean scores in the universe sample.  
Such differences need to be accounted for in the model.  Finally to check for the alternate 
hypothesis, economic openness, I include an indicator that captures a country’s level of 
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trade openness, measured as imports plus exports/ GDP, taken from the KOF Index of 
Globalisation.  A full list of the descriptive statistics is located in the appendix (Table B).   
       When estimating the determinants of a variable such as corruption, careful analysis is 
clearly needed.  Thus I run multiple models in this analysis to test the robustness of the 
results.  The empirical field of scholarship mainly has reservations about running time 
series, panel analyses with corruption indicators as the dependent variable though 
multiple years exist for each indicator.  Therefore, I report the estimated results of cross-
sectional averages in the first section of the results.  However, due to the diachronic 
variance in openness measures, along with PRS and World Bank corruption scores, I 
report the results of time series, panel data regressions as well to increase the number of 
observations.  The unit of analysis is thus the state-year in the panel, time series data and 
I use a generalised least squares (GLS) regression analysis for the time series data and 
account for potential problems of first series autocorrelation within panels and cross-
sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels.  The estimated model with 
controls is thus: 
Corruption = bo + b1(social or political openness) + b2(trade openness) + 
b3(democracy) + b4 (economic development) + b5 (fractionalisation) + b6 (conflicts) 
+b7(Africa) + b8 (Middle east) + b9(S.E. Asia) + ei 
       
 
Results 
        Tables 2 and 3 display both cross-sectional and time series analyses for the entire 
sample of developing states6, then a stratified sample of states for which press freedoms 
were coded as ‘not free’.  As stated, two measures of corruption are employed to check 
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for consistency in the findings.  As a reminder, both corruption indices are coded such 
that positive coefficients indicate better governance, or a reduction in corruption. As 
mentioned, there are a number of empirical analyses that utilise cross-sectional data 
exclusively when studying corruption as the dependent variable.  Yet, due to both sources 
of data containing diachronic variance as well, both cross sectional and panel time series 
regressions are listed to use the most variance possible.  Table 2 reports the results using 
the PRS Group data on corruption.  Models 1 and 4 report the general bivariate baseline 
relationship between social openness and corruption levels in developing states, while 
models 2 and 5 report the estimates along with a series of control variables to account for 
rival hypotheses, including the effect of trade openness.  According to these models, the 
expectation that the higher the level of the social openness index, the lower the corruption 
level, finds strong empirical support both in country averages and over time.  The 
relationship is stronger in the time series models as the number of observations increases 
relative to the panel analysis.  Interestingly, in models 2 and 5, which control for a 
number of alternative determinants, the impact of social openness on corruption is 4 and 
2 times greater respectively than that of trade openness.  However, increased levels of 
democracy and GDP per capita, are clearly the two leading deterrents of corruption in the 
models.  Other significant determinants of corruption include the strength of democratic 
institutions, economic growth, trade openness and ethnic fractionalisation.   However, as 
anticipated, when estimating the effects of social openness on states without press 
freedoms, a substantially different result is found.  In model 3, with cross-sectional 
averages of the variables, the coefficient estimate drops from 95% significance from 
model 2 to statistically indistinguishable from ‘0’.  Moreover, in model 6, using the time 
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series data, the relationship between social openness and corruption becomes negative 
and the coefficient is significant at the 99% level of confidence, demonstrating that as 
social indicators of openness increase, levels of corruption are actually likely to rise as a 
function of social openness at a rate .014 for each standard deviation increase, even when 
including the control variables.   
***Table 2 About Here*** 
 
        Models 7-12 analyse the effect of political openness on corruption using the PRS 
Group data.  Interestingly the models analysing this type of openness report starkly 
different results from those reported in the social openness models as the two types of 
interdependence clearly have distinguishable effects from one another on the dependent 
variable.  While each of the baseline models finds a positive bivariate relationship 
between political openness and a reduction of corruption (yet only in model 10 is this 
relationship significant), neither estimate reaches a statistical significance in models 8 
and 11 when all the control variables are included into the analysis.  Surprisingly, trade 
openness, while in the expected direction, is not a significant determinant of corruption 
when accounting for political openness in models 8 and 11.  However, it appears that 
political openness is a significant factor in reducing corruption in states with low press 
freedoms.  In both models 9 and 12 the estimates are significant at the 90% and 95% 
levels of confidence respectively and indicate that a one unit increase in the political 
openness index reduces PRS corruption scores (or improve government impartiality) 
ranging from ‘0’ to ‘1’ by .001.  It is also noteworthy that while trade openness is a 
positive and significant determinant for reducing corruption levels in models 8 and 11, 
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which employ a full sample of developing states, such openness drops from significance 
in samples where the press is not free (models 9 and 12).  In all models where control 
variables are included, such determinants as democracy level and economic development 
demonstrate robust findings throughout. 
 
***Table 3 about Here*** 
        Table 3 reports results using corruption data from the World Bank in order to check 
for consistency in the estimates from the PRS data.  In general, similar estimates are 
observed between the models regardless of using the different data sources of corruption, 
yet significance levels are slightly weaker, throughout which could be due to more 
missing data and less overall observations compared with the PRS Group corruption 
measure.  Again, a strong bivariate relationship exists between social openness and lower 
corruption and this relationship is positive and significant at the 95% level of confidence 
in the time series model.  Moving to models 2 and 5 in Table 3, results are slightly 
weaker than in table 3, yet the social openness coefficient is positive and strongly 
significant in the panel, time series model.  Again, the coefficient for social openness 
demonstrates a much greater impact on corruption than that of trade openness.  For 
example, this relationship is over 10 times stronger in model 5.  However, the impact of 
social openness indicators on corruption is significant and negative in both the cross 
sectional and the panel, time series estimates when countries do not have a free press.  On 
explanation for this may be that the spreads of such international influences are countered 
by strong state-run propaganda which reinforces the corruptive behaviour of the state.  
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         Moving to political openness with the World Bank data, which mainly captures a 
country’s involvement with IO’s and UN missions abroad, again a marginally positive 
and insignificant relationship is present in models 8 and 11 when controlling for 
economic development, trade openness, democracy level, conflicts, fractionalisation and 
region for the entire sample of developing countries.  On the other hand, the two 
regressions in models 9 and 12 that include only states with severely limited press 
freedoms (and state-years in the time series model) find a strongly positive and 
significant relationship with political openness and curbing corruption even when 
accounting for rival factors.  Thus, it appears that while domestic elite in countries 
without a free press can successfully filter information in their favour when it comes to 
social openness, more pressure is placed on them when confronted with international elite 
as they become more politically open.  These results support some of the findings in 
Sandholtz and Gray (2003) yet go farther in considering the domestic context of press 
rights.   Table 4 lists a complete summary of the findings and the empirical support for 
the hypotheses according to the results in tables 2 and 3.   
 
***Table 4 Here*** 
 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
       This analysis has examined the relationship between two non-trade forms of 
international openness and corruption while taking into account the level of press 
freedoms for a large sample of developing states.  The results found in this analysis 
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demonstrate clearly the complex relationship between openness and corruption that has 
remained largely unexplored in previous analyses.  This study has contributed to the 
literature in a number of interesting ways.  One though many studies have committed 
substantial empirical study to the economic side of the openness-corruption nexus (trade, 
trade barriers, capital freedom, etc.) this analysis gives further insight into other 
important components of globalisation — namely the spread of socio-political forces.  
Second, due to the data availability on social and political openness, I have been able to 
parse out their individual effects on the dependent variable in question.  Third, this 
analysis pays specific attention to how international variables (socio-political openness) 
are impacted by domestic institutions (the level of press freedom) in their impact on 
government corruption.  Previous studies have treated openness whether economic or 
socio-political, as independent of domestic institutions which may or may not filter their 
effects on such dependent variables as corruption and other domestic behaviour.  Finally, 
this study restricts the sample to developing states exclusively.  It is widely known 
among scholars and policy makers that the OECD 24 exhibit better scores on fighting 
corruption no matter which source of data are employed.  Studies on combating 
corruption also infer heavily that their purpose is to aid developing and transitioning 
countries battle this dilemma.  Thus this analysis has sought to parse out the differences 
in the sample of states and focus on only those outside the OECD 24 to offer specific 
utility for transitioning states.    
        Social and political openness increase information to a number of new actors in 
politics.  Yet according to the empirical findings their impact on corruption is not 
monolithic.  As countries become more involved in formal international networks (IO’s, 
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UN missions, embassy exchange) the impact of political openness on domestic 
corruption requires less domestic freedom of information because of the pressure to 
govern better come directly from international actors such as IO members and foreign 
diplomats.  Such direct interaction from abroad compels corrupt elites in developing 
states to conform to the ‘rules of the game’, and in turn make efforts to curb corruption to 
avoid a backlash from their international counterparts.  This type of integration should 
continue to be encouraged by the international community as it appears to have a 
significant impact on corruption, especially in cases where the freedom of the press is 
heavily censured by governments. 
        On the other hand, as social openness increases, information about anti corruption 
norms is also proliferated.  However, while direct contact with international elites is 
made with increases in political openness, social openness relies on everyday citizens 
becoming more and more informed through new channels of information taking shape 
such as new technology coming from international sources.  Through the increased use of 
the Internet, telephones, foreign newspapers, tourism, and contact with foreigners, people 
obtain more information and in turn are more likely to pressure their government to 
become less corrupt.  However, the relationship between these two variables is not 
directly related as evidenced by the lack of any significant relationship between social 
openness and corruption in cases of low press freedoms.  For social openness to be an 
effective tool in fighting corruption, a certain level of domestic press freedoms must first 
be in place, otherwise information is censured and people do not become informed.  
Thus, policy-wise, this type of integration should be highly encouraging as an effective 
means of fighting corruption in transitioning countries when the press has a substantial 
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degree of freedom from the government.  If not, advocating the flow of international 
information channels into states with limited press freedoms is shown to be highly 
ineffective.  According to the evidence, such openness can even make matters worse for 
government quality   
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 - Trends and Annual Means Comparison of Openness Between Free/ 
Partially   
 Free Press vs. Not Free Press : 1994-2004 - 95 Non-OECD States Only  
         
  Level of Social Openness Level of Political Openness Observations 
Year Free Not Free T significance Free Not Free T significance Free Not Free 
1994 36.5  27.7  2.49 46.1 43.5 0.43 73 22 
1995 39.6  31.7  2.04 43.5 50.5 -1.34 67 27 
1996 42.2  31.6  2.71 43.0 50.9 -1.54 69 26 
1997 43.0  33.9  2.37 44.3 47.8 -0.65 67 28 
1998 44.4  34.5  2.62 43.7 50.3 -1.31 67 28 
1999 44.5  36.8  2.01 46.7 50.1 -0.64 65 30 
2000 45.8  36.0  2.60 47.3 48.5 -0.14 65 30 
2001 50.1  38.8  3.01 52.9 45.5 1.42 68 27 
2002 50.1  38.9  3.01 51.9 46.7 1.02 68 27 
2003 49.9  42.4  2.05 52.5 51.7 0.15 63 32 
2004 49.7  42.4  2.03 55.4 53.0 0.49 61 34 
                  
Note: data on press freedoms taken from Freedom House while Openness was data taken from the KOF Index 
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 Levels of Press Freedom: PRS Group
Baseline Full Model Low Press Baseline Full Model Low Press Baseline Full Model Low Press Baseline Full Model Low Press
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
.006*** .004** .001 .004*** .002*** -.003***
(9.41) (2.48) (0.36) (19.55) (5.43) (-3.60)
.002 .001 .001* .001*** .0003 .001**
(1.61) (1.01) (1.81) (3.72) (1.63) (2.70)
.001* .001 .001** .000 .002** .002 .001*** .0004
(1.93) (0.49) (2.07) (0.68) (2.65) (0.85) (4.61) (0.71)
.012* .019** .007*** .001 .006* 0.14* .004** .003
(1.83) (2.09) (3.56) (1.12) (1.81) (1.91) (2.65) (0.75)
.029* .087** .058*** .132*** .072*** .101*** .070*** .074***
(1.91) (2.00) (10.11) (9.06) (5.87) (3.95) (16.87) (9.80)
-.003 -.037 -.074*** -.034 -.037 -.005 -.065** .075
-(0.17) (-0.51) (-3.60) (-1.09) (-0.50) (0.15) (-2.76) (1.51)
Conflicts -.005 -.001 -.006 -.003 -.008 -.010 .003 -.007
(-0.75) (0.11) (-1.44) (1.41) (1.02) (0.51) (0.77) (-1.00)
Constant -.102 -.336 .293*** -.055 -.316*** .419*** -.264** -.384 .415*** -.097** .104
(-0.85) (-1.20) (34.24) (1.50) (3.85) (10.41) (-2.25) (1.36) (40.34) -(2.39) (-1.41)
Rsq. .58 .58 .75 .02 .56 .77
# of Obs. 835 791 226 835 791 226
85 85 23 86 86 40 85 84 23 86 86 40
'Basline' represents the bivariate relationship between openness and corruption. 
Low Press' is a stratified sample that includes only those states (and state-years) in which press freedoms are 'not free'.
Table 2 - The Effect of Social and Political Interdependence and Openness on Corruption at Various 
Social Openness Political Openness
Cross-Section Time series, Panel Data Cross-Section Time series, Panel Data
Social Openness
Political Openness
Trade Openness
Democracy Level
Log GDP per cap.
Ethnic Frac.
Num. Of Countries
note: p*<.10, p**<.05, p***<.01.  Dependent variables are PRS Group Measure of corruption, measured from '0' to '1', lower scores indicating more corruption
Time series data from 1994-2003.  Cross sectional averages from 1995-2003.
 t-statistics in parenthases.
All standard errors in cross-sectioal models are robust and corrected for heteroskadasticity and autocorrelation in time series, panel regression.  
Full Model' represents includes the entire sample with the full set of controls.  
  All models run with area dummies to control for geography.  'Number of Countries' indicates the number of countries with at least '1' state-year as either coded 'not-free' or 'free'. 
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Table 3 - The Effect of Social and Political Interdependence and Openness on Corruption at Various 
Leves of Press Freedon: World Bank Data
Social Openness Political Openness
Cross-Section Time series, Panel Data Cross-Section Time series, Panel Data
Basline Full Model Low Press Basline Full Model Low Press Basline Full Model Low Press Basline Full Model Low Press
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Social Openness .016*** .011 -.074* .007*** .011** -.014**
(3.38) (0.94) (-1.93) (3.08) (2.44) (-2.00)
Political Openness .009** .006 .023** .002 .002 .007**
(2.28) (1.06) (2.06) (1.17) (1.04) (2.15)
Trade Openness .001 .030** .001 .002*** .003 .004 .001 .011**
(0.23) (2.15) (0.64) (3.19) (0.48) (0.33) (0.09) (2.42)
Democracy Level .151*** .158* .119*** .045 .137** .075 .118*** .008
(3.26) (1.72) (5.51) (0.35) (2.87) (0.66) (5.46) (0.22)
Log GDP per cap. .114 .765 .158** .015 .026 .287* .080 .191**
(0.65) (1.65) (2.26) (1.37) (0.30) (1.87) (1.57) (2.31)
Ethnic Frac. .041 1.688** .196 .133 1.296** .317 .145
(-0.09) (-2.79) (0.83) (-0.37) (-2.22) (1.41) (-1.54)
Conflicts .028 .233 .102** .091 .199 .238 .120** .065
(-0.41) (-0.52) (-2.05) (-1.67) (-1.38) (0.86) (-2.42) (1.08)
Constant .695** .751 5.044* .334** .250n .213n 3.74*** .722 4.089* .126 .511 .041
(-2.93) (-0.83) (-1.91) (-3.03) (-0.60) (-0.27) (-9.74) (-0.88) (-1.96) (-1.33) (-1.41) (-0.09)
Rsq. .11 .21 .45 .04 .13 .41
# of Obs. 95 85 19 566 382 97 88 80 19 560 382 97
Num. Of Countries 95 85 19 96 80 32 88 80 19 95 80 32
'Basline' represents the bivariate relationship between openness and corruption. 
Low Press' is a stratified sample that includes only those states (and state-years) in which press freedoms are 'not free'.
 t-statistics in parenthases.
Time series data from 1994-2003.  Cross sectional averages from 1995-2003.
note: p*<.10, p**<.05, p***<.01.  Dependent variables are World Bank measurement of corruption, measured from '-2.5' to '2.5', lower scores indicating more 
All standard errors in cross-sectioal models are robust and corrected for heteroskadasticity and autocorrelation in time series, panel regression.  
Full Model' represents includes the entire sample with the full set of controls.  
  All models run with area dummies to control for geography.  'Number of Countries' indicates the number of countries with at least '1' state-year as either coded 'not-free' or 'free'. 
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Appendix 
A) Social and Political Openness Indicators 
KOF Components of Social and Political Openness Indices 
       
Openness  Indicator   % Weighted   
1) Social             
a) Data on Personal Contact    29%  
  Outgoing Telephone Traffic  14%  
  Transfers   8%  
  International Tourism   27%  
  Foreign Population   25%  
    International letters    27%  
b) Data on Information Flows    35%  
  Internet Hosts (per 1000 people)  20%  
  Internet Users (per 1000 people)  24%  
  Cable Television (per 1000 people)  20%  
  Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP)  14%  
    Radios (per 1000 people)  23%  
c) Data on Cultural Proximity    36%  
  Number of McDonald's (per capita)  40%  
  Number of Ikea (per capita)  40%  
  Trade in books (percent of GDP)  20%  
              
2) Political      
  Embassies in Country  35%  
  memberships in I.O.'s  36%  
  
Participation in U.N. Sec. Council 
Missions 29%  
              
note: source is the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher 2006)   
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 B) List of States 
Albania**  Gabon  Guyana  
Algeria**  Ghana**  Papua New Guinea 
Argentina  Haiti**  Paraguay  
Bahamas  Honduras  Peru**  
Bahrain**  Hungary  Philippines  
Bangladesh**  India  Poland  
Barbados  Indonesia**  Guinea-Bissau* 
Bolivia  Iran**  Romania  
Botswana  Israel  Russian Federation** 
Brazil  Cote d'Ivoire** Rwanda**  
Belize  Jamaica  Saudi Arabia** 
Bulgaria  Jordan**  Senegal  
Burma/ Myanmar** Kenya**  Sierra Leone** 
Burundi**  Korea, South Singapore**  
Cameroon**  Kuwait**  Slovakia  
Central African Republic** Latvia  Slovenia  
Sri Lanka  Lithuania  South Africa 
Chad**  Madagascar  Zimbabwe**  
Chile  Malawi  Syria**  
China**  Malaysia**  Thailand  
Colombia**  Mali  Togo**  
Congo**  Malta  Oman**  
Congo, Democratic Republic** Mauritius  Trinidad and Tobago 
Costa Rica  Mexico  United Arab Emirates** 
Croatia**  Morocco**  Tunisia**  
Cyprus  Namibia  Turkey**  
Czech Republic Nepal**  Uganda  
Benin  Nicaragua  Ukraine**  
Dominican Republic Niger**  Egypt**  
Ecuador  Nigeria**  Tanzania  
El Salvador  Pakistan**   Uruguay  
Estonia  Panama  Venezuela  
Fiji  Guatemala  Zambia**  
**Indicates at least 1 year coded as ‘Not Free’ Press 
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 C) Summary of Variables 
     
Variable   Obs. Mean St. dev. Min  Max 
PRS Corruption 1590 .483 .175 .055 .944 
World Bank Corruption 566 -.025 .965 -2.129 2.515 
Social Openness 3143 30.58 16.21 1.93 92.75 
Political Openness 3143 39.75 21.55 1 96.04 
Trade Openness 2689 46.30 20.44 4.25 97.78 
Log GDP  3178 6.88 1.26 4.04 10.31 
Democracy 2877 4.89 3.16 0 10 
Ethnic fractionalization 3358 .494 .241 .001 .931 
Conflicts  3136 .337 .818 0 8 
Press Freedom 1055 48.32 21.01 7 100 
High Press Freedom 1055 .299 .458 0 1 
Middle Press Freedom 1055 .405 .491 0 1 
Low Press Freedom 1055 .294 .456 0 1 
Africa  3358 .302 .459 0 1 
Middle East 3358 .135 .342 0 1 
S.E. Asia  3358 .065 .242 0 1 
Latin America 3358 .261 .439 0 1 
              
 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 See Sandholtz and Gray (2003: 769-773) for a thorough overview of IO commitment to fighting corruption 
2 See Gatti (2004: 853)  
3 There is a small degree of variance in the numbers due to changes in press freedom scores over time as recorded by 
Freedom House.  Thus, some might be recorded as ‘not free’ one year and then make improvements enough to increase 
their score, or vice versa.   
4 Regions are based  on the data from Hedenius and Teorell (2005) 
5 See http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx  
6 Developing states are those that were not in the OECD 24.  A full list is located in the appendix.  Such models are run 
using GLS estimates which account for first order autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity between panels.   
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